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New Labor Law
As finally adopted, The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
is a synthesis of several bills and motions1
introduced at various stages of the deliberations in the Senate and House of Representatives. That legislation so vigorously
opposed by labor could come out of a
Congress whose Democratic majorities had
been increased a year ago by victories of
labor-supported candidates surprised both
labor leaders and usually well informed
observers.
Leo C. Brown, S. J., National Director
of the Institute of Social Order, has recently
2
criticized the new labor law in an article
which stresses the point that Congress deserves criticism less for the law it wrote
than for the law it failed to write.
The fact has become apparent that union
officials, once they learn the requirements
of the law, are gravely concerned. Most
disquieting to them, of course, are the
criminal provisions of the law. The law
punishes only for willful violations, but
its detail and its obscurity offer occasions
for material violations through mere inadvertence. What labor officials are asking
is whether, in the atmosphere created by
1 Notably, the Landrum-Griffin Act.
2 9 SOCIAL ORDER,

No. 10 (1959).

years of unfavorable publicity of the corruption in some unions, investigating agencies and juries will be prepared to accept
a defense of inadvertence, no matter how
justified it may be.
The outlook of union people is darkened
by their multiple problems both internal
and external, by the dismal failure of their
efforts first to block and then to modify
the reform legislation, and by a widespread
conviction among them that they must expect the severest interpretation which regulation agencies and courts can place upon
the law.
Father Brown, however, is inclined to
adopt a much less pessimistic outlook. The
law, he concedes, is definitely restrictive
and needlessly burdensome, but will not
destroy labor unions and it is doubtful that
it will seriously hamper them in the achievement of legitimate goals. While the federal
courts, upon whose decisions the interpretation of the new legislation will ultimately
depend, have shown an increasing appreciation of the changed status and present
power of labor unions, they have likewise
demonstrated a perceptive sympathy for
the needs and problems of collective bargaining.
Father Brown observes that the objectives of the legislation might have been
achieved more simply and more effectively
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had less reliance been placed on the courts
for enforcement and more on a regulation
agency. More specifically, he suggests that
the fullest measure of genuine democracy
would have been preserved and promoted
by giving the unions the choice: 1. of adopting their own codes of ethics and enforcement tribunals (which could have been
required to meet minimum standards set up
by the enforcing agency) or 2. of being
subjected to regulation by the agency.
He concludes:
Such an experiment might have required
the temporary toleration of some abuses
of lesser moment. But the preservation of
the fullest measure of self rule, and the
diversity and flexibility which it permits,
is worth some costs. The effort should have
been made. The results might well have
been sounder than this legislation will
achieve.
Public Funds for Birth Control
In their November meeting, our bishops
condemned the use of public funds to promote artificial birth prevention. Catholicbaiters seized upon the statement with all
the eager delight of a Neanderthal hunter
reaching for his favorite club. They have
since used it as a handy weapon for clobbering all Catholics in general and presidential-aspirant Catholics in particular.
As a political "hot potato," the controversy has been notably cooled by President
Eisenhower's observation that the issue of
birth control promotion is moral and religious and so outside the areas of political
discussion. The President's balanced judgment hasn't, however, stopped debate in
the rarefied atmosphere of speculative
morality.
A clear, concise explanation of the Catholic position on the matter was made in a
recent editorial by Aidan M. Carr, O.F.M.
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Cony., in the January 1960 issue of The
Homiletic and Pastoral Review.
Father Carr states:
If a president of the United States,
Catholic or otherwise, were confronted
with the question of governmental promotion of birth control, all Catholic moralists
would agree that he could not himself
initiate such a program. The thorny problem arises if he should be presented with
legislation already passed by Congress and
containing a provision for the dissemination of contraceptive techniques. His approval of the bill, even in circumstances
where a sound prudential argument might
be adduced in favor of the passage of it
as a lesser evil, would - in the eyes of his
fellow countrymen - cause him to appear
favorable to the goals of the legislation.
Whatever his personal intention before
God, his action would most certainly
scandalize any genuinely Christian conscience.
An alternative would lie in his shelving
the bill, thereby neither expressly approving
nor disapproving of it. But, under the Constitution, such a procedure would have the
same result as if he signed it: the bill would
become law after ten days. It is a probable
opinion that he could morally thus dissociate himself from the proposed law if, by
doing so, he precluded greater evils, e.g.,
public disturbances consequent upon a veto.
But we are of the opinion that he would
be more probably obliged to veto legislation containing a contraceptive program,
although it is difficult to pre-judge a case in
the abstract. Actually, of course, a law
of this kind would be law only in a technical sense, for nothing unnatural can
achieve the quality of true law.
Under the American system, a president
is a very powerful man as well as a free
agent who must be guided, in all his official
acts, by the law of the land and by his
personal convictions. Every chief executive, Catholic or not, has the right and the
duty to work toward a legislative program
and an administration reflecting his own
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moral principles. This includes his use of
the power of veto, a potent negative force
in all legislative matters.
Any president who would not struggle legally and justly, of course - toward the
country's good as he sees it in the light of
his convictions would, we're convinced,
betray those who chose him for the highest
office of a nation proud of its devotion to
the loftiest ideals of individual liberty.
Every American has a perfect right to
decide for himself whether or not he wants
to vote for a Catholic as president, but if
one does so vote, then one must accept
the candidate as he is. It certainly appears
un-American to require the leader of our
nation to subordinate his highest loyalties
to mere considerations of political expediency.
Released Time Programs
A recent comment appearing in the
Baylor Law Review, entitled "The Released Time Program In the Public
Schools" once again gives voice to the oft
repeated error - "The right not to believe is
guaranteed under the Constitution."
The comment attempts to impartially
weigh the pros and cons of "released time
programs" - a term which applies generally
to school programs which provide for release, on written request of their parents,
of public school students during regular
hours in order to receive sectarian instruction.
Based upon the conclusion that the First
Amendment guarantees the right of children to form their own religious or nonreligious beliefs, the author resolves the
issue by stating that released time programs should be declared unconstitutional
since they impair the "free exercise principle."
The error in such reasoning is clearly
3 11 BAYLOR L. REv. 292 (1959).

established by the following correct explanation of the First Amendment:
1. The idea of the separation of church
and state as a "wall of separation" between
the church and the state is only a metaphor, a figure of speech, a slogan, or a
shibboleth which is not a part of the American tradition or constitutional history.
2. The First Amendment was not intended to divorce religion from government
or to impose government neutrality between
believers and disbelievers but to meet in a
practical manner the problems raised by
a multiplicity of sects by prohibiting Congress from adopting any one religion.
3. There was no intent on the part of
the drafters to bar a general support of
religion by the federal government, and
therefore the limitation does not prohibit
the non-preferential expenditure for religious purposes of funds raised by federal
taxes.
4. The First Amendment does not bar
preferential treatment of a particular religion or sect short of according it monopolistic recognition.
Thus, since the constitutional provisions
were only for equality among believers, the
Constitution does not in any way guarantee
freedom of non-belief.
Church Law
The last decade has seen much attention
given, in court decision and legal writing,
such as the aforementioned Baylor Law
Review comment, to the constitutional
problems involved in Church-State relationships under American constitutions.
4
Familiar is Everson v. Board of Educ.
and the ensuing discussion concerning the
extent to which, consistent with constitu4 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
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tional mandate, the State may aid in the
transportation of parochial pupils*. Even
more familiar is the celebrated McCollum
v. Board of Educ.5 decision with its strict

requirements of complete separation of
Church and State, followed only a few years
later by Zorach v. Clauson6 in which the
Supreme Court of the United States retreated from the extreme position of
McCollum.
Under the governmental and social structure of this country there exist many other
problems of Church-State relationship.
Although in the present state of American
constitutional doctrine these problems do
not raise constitutional issues, they do present legal issues which are at once difficult,
interesting, and important to both Church
and State. Thus there are questions concerning the appropriate extent to which
the State should regulate the creation and
termination of various types of religious
bodies and the extent to which the State
should concern itself with the internal management, operation, and control of active
religious organizations. Despite the known
existence of these and analogous problems
of a legal nature, concentration of attention
upon the constitutional aspects of ChurchState relations has appeared to leave relatively unconsidered these less spectacular
but at the same time equally significant
problems. Sensing the need for a comprehensive consideration of such questions, the
Summer 1959 issue of The Ohio State Law
Journal7 contains a symposium devoted entirely to the subject of church law. The
articles, both separately and together, provide an effective insight into a relatively
unexplored area of the law.
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Usury
Lawyers and economists who are interested in religious and ethical thought on
the morality of interest will find a wealth
of information on the subject in a recently
published book by Thomas F. Devine,
SJ., entitled Interest - An Historical and
Analytical Study in Economics and Modern
Ethics.8
Father Devine has taken a new approach
to the problem of usury. While others have
justified interest on titles extrinsic to the
nature of economic interest, he asks the
question which goes to the heart of the
problem, namely: "can interest be justified
on purely intrinsic grounds? From the very
nature of economic interest, can an intrinsic title to interest on a money loan be
proved to exist?"
The author's conclusions may be summarized as follows:
1. From the point of view of commutative justice, interest is morally justified
as the market price of present income in
terms of future income.
2. Interest as a functional share is warranted on grounds of distributive justice as
a remuneration corresponding to the value
of the contribution of the services of capital
to the total product of the economic system.
3. In view of the requirements of social
justice: (a) an individual's right to interest
in commutative justice may be superseded
by an obligation to lend gratuitously to a
needy borrower; (b) the State should by
appropriate measures strive to reduce existing inequalities of ownership of wealth
that the functional share of interest may
benefit as large a proportion of the popula-

5333 U. S. 203 (1948).
6 343 U. S. 306 (1952).
7 20 OHIo ST. L. J. 387 (1959).
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8Marquette Univ. Press, Milwaukee.
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tion as possible; (c) the State should afford
whatever protection is required in the field
of small lending for consumption where
forces of competition are less likely to operate on a wide scale; (d) economists are in
quite general agreement that the government can, by a judicious use of monetary
and fiscal policies, assist in achieving and
maintaining a high level of employment
and fairly stable rate of economic growth
which would connotate an obligation on the
part of the State to assist in the attainment
of those goals, and though there is less
agreement regarding the importance to be
attached to them in the changing phases
of the cycle and other ebbs and flows of the
price level and the level of employment, it
is, nevertheless, conceded that policies
which influence the interest rate are among
the important and sometimes necessary
means of achieving those ends.
Robert J. McEwen, S.J., in his fine review of the book in the January 1960 issue
of Social Order praises it highly as marked
by sober and careful scholarship, by sharp
and penetrating economic analysis and by
a deep concern for the social problems
associated with interest and interest rates.
The following concluding paragraph of
his review, however, indicates that he feels
that the door is wide open for further
thinking and writing on the subject:
This problem of interest has stirred the
imagination, aroused the emotions and exercised the intellects of men of all classes
for' centuries. Even now, in the halls of
Congress and in the political debates of the
coming year, it promises to become one
of the chief topics of debate for the American people. Father Devine's book should
cause us to clarify our own thinking on
these problems; it should, moreover, bring
closer the day when we may present an
intellectually respectable and generally ac-

cepted Catholic position on money and
interest.
Goble-Kenealy Debate
For the last four years Father William
J. Kenealy and Professor George W. Goble
have engaged in what they choose to call a
"friendly debate" on the natural law
through a series of articles first appearing in the American Bar Association
Journal and lately in THE CATHOLIC LAWYER.

9

.The latest contribution to this discussion,
"The Mutability of Law" by Professor
Goble, appears in the November 1959 issue
of The Hastings Law Journal.
The article consists largely in a repetition of the material originally presented by
Professor Goble in his CATHOLIC LAWYER
article "The Dilemma of the Natural Law."
The only new element is a summary of
human history according to Durant and
Wells.
Professor Goble's article attempts, by
argument and by appeal to his historical
authorities, to make these points:
1 There are and can be no absolute
rules or principles of morality.
2. Moral rules and principles are made
by men, according to the objectives and
purposes they have adopted de facto as controlling for their time and in their society.
3. Man's morality is a product of the
general process of biological and social
evolution.
These three points deny, at least im9 Goble, Nature, Man and Law, 41 A.B.A.J. 403
(1955); Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIc LAWYER 259 (1955); Goble, The Dilemma
of the Natural Law, 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226
(1956);- Kenealy, Scholastic Natural Law-Professor Goble's Dilemma, 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER
22 (1957).
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plicitly, that there is a rationally discoverable morality in the nature of man, which
morality is constant as man's essential nature is constant. To deny these things is
to deny that man can rationally discover a
necessary moral relation between himself
and the Creator of the Universe. To argue
such denial is to attempt to subvert the
philosophical foundations of religion.
Natural Law
As a balance to Professor Goble's pessimistic outlook on the natural law, it is
refreshing to come upon an article in the
November 1959 issue of the Melbourne
University Law Review by R. D. Lumb,
entitled "Scholastic Doctrine of Natural
Law." 1 0 Another article by Professor Lumb
- "Natural Law - An Unchanging Standard?" will appear in the Spring 1960 issue
of

THE CATHOLIC LAWYER.

In his current article, Professor Lumb
carefully and critically examines the doctrine of natural law as expounded in the
works of Aquinas and Suarez, in order to
clarify the basic elements of the doctrine
and provide answers to questions which at
first sight seem to raise insuperable difficulties.
The article is divided into five parts. In
the first part there is a brief discussion of
the eternal law. In the second part, discussion centers on the relationship between
human inclination and human reason. The
third part examines the meaning of the
word "law" as it is used in the phrase
"natural law." The fourth part considers
the relationship between the primary and
secondary precepts of the natural law and
their cognitional status. The fifth part dis-
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cusses the statement that the natural law
is a universal moral code and constitutes
the standard for the action of the individual.
Segregation
The decisions of the Supreme Court in
the school-integration cases have created
enormous issues, which have grown progressively more serious in the five years
since Brown v. Board of Educ. 1' The current issue of the Notre Dame Lawyer
contains a symposium devoted to The
Problems and Responsibilities of Desegregation12 which makes a substantial
contribution toward the resolution of these
grave issues. The purpose of the symposium
is not to debate the merits or demerits of
the Supreme Court's decisions. Its purpose
is to concentrate on the practical problems
arising from the Court's decisions and on
the responsibilities, in relation to these
problems, of public officials, of the
churches, of educators and school administrators, of the Negro community and of
the legal profession. The symposium approaches the matter constructively with the
idea of illuminating the problems involved
and making practical suggestions for their
solution.
Dean Joseph O'Meara, in his introduction to the symposium, states:
There are two ways of approaching a
problem: one is to see it as a road block,
the other as a challenge. Our Symposium
has been planned on the assumption that
the latter is the approach that should be
made. It has been planned, moreover, on
the assumption that, if we can stop calling names long enough to take a hard look
11347 U.

10 2 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 205 (1959).
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S. 483 (1954).

12 34 NOTRE DAME LAw. 607 (1959).
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at the practical problems involved in desegregation, and to assess our responsibilities with respect thereto, we will find
the answer to this crisis of education, this
crisis of law, this crisis of morals; and
thus will be able to face the challenge of a
thermonuclear world as one united people.
Criminal Responsibility
There are a great many areas within
the law in which the problem of determining the responsibility of a defendant merges
in a confused and confusing way with
extra-legal matters, and especially with
fundamental questions of ethics. No particular legal problem encounters this complication more directly, or with greater
need of clarification, than that of establishing a proper standard for exculpation on
grounds of mental disorder, or insanity.
Readers of last winter's CATHOLIC LAWYER Symposium on Mental Disease and
CriminalResponsibility 3 may be interested
in another article on the subject which appeared in the Fall 1959 issue of the
University of Miami Law Review entitled
Criminal Responsibility and the Knowl14
edge of Right and Wrong.
In essence the article condemns without
qualification, the M'Naghten Rule, on the
grounds that it does not meet the minimal
requirements for clear, consistent, and
authoritative standards applicable with
reasonable stability and justice.
The specific objection made is that
there are conflicting beliefs concerning the
grounds of knowledge in moral affairs,
conflicting opinions concerning the nature
of the ethically right and wrong, and confusions with respect to the intended legal
significance of these terms.
13 5 CATHOLIC

LAWYER 1 (1959).

14 14 U. MiAMI L. REV. 30 (1959).

While the author does not expressly
claim that objective moral standards do
not exist, he argues that the question of
their existence has been the source of prolonged and profound philosophical dispute.
He concludes therefore that knowledge of
the difference between the morally right
and wrong is a most unsatisfactory test of
criminal responsibility since, whenever the
existence of moral standards of just that
kind is a matter of genuine doubt, the whole
system of establishing the responsibility of
mentally disordered offenders will be
viewed as without foundation.
These objections have all been satisfactorily answered in the aforementioned symposium. The basic criticism that can be
made of this article however is that it
makes no constructive or corrective suggestions with respect to the defects which
the author claims exist in the present
M'Naghten Rule. He concludes his critique
with the following observations:
Because psychiatry is not yet a perfectly exact science; because there are so
many intermediate cases between the completely insane on the one hand and the
perfectly sane (if any) on the other; and
above all because the philosophical problems of responsibility are puzzling, and
perhaps perpetually so- for all of these
reasons and more, the line drawn between
the legally responsible and the legally nonresponsible must be somewhat arbitrary.
Whatever the difficulties may be in drawing this line, however, they do not justify
the continued use of a test or standard of
criminal responsibility which is crude, obsolete, impractical and unjust. For, as it
has been shown here at length, confusion,
mistake, inconsistency and injustice are the
natural consequences of approaching the
problem of the responsibility of the mentally disordered by asking about the defendant's knowledge of the difference between
right and wrong.

